Counterman v. Colorado, USSC No. 22-138; cert. granted 1/13/23; reversed 6/27/23 Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)
Question presented:
Whether, to establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective “reasonable person” would regard the statement as a threat of violence.
The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. renders deportable noncitizens who are convicted of aggravated felonies after they admitted to the U.S.. Under the I.N.A., “an offense relating to the obstruction of justice” where the term of imprisonment is at least one year qualifies as an aggravated felony whether it is committed in violation of state or federal law. In Pugin v. Garland, Case No. 22-23, SCOTUS will address whether the crime of being an accessory after the fact to a felony is an “offense relating to the obstruction of justice.” And in Garland v. Cordero-Garcia, Case No. 22-331, SCOTUS will address the same question regarding crimes that don’t interfere with existing investigations or judicial proceedings. For more, see SCOTUSblog’s coverage here.
State v. Jeffrey L. Hineman, 2023 WI 1, 1/10/23, reversing a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2020AP226, case activity (including briefs)
At Hineman’s trial for sexual assault of a child, a police officer testified that she believed the child had accused Hineman of touching him several months before her investigation began, and several months before the child made similar statements in a forensic interview. This wasn’t true, and the officer’s police report contradicted her testimony on this point: it said a CPS report had noted no allegations of abuse. But when defense counsel attempted to impeach the officer with her own report, the officer testified that she “didn’t know if” she’d “documented” the alleged prior consistent accusation, and while she “would think [she] would have” written such information in the report, she “might not have.” It would have been easy to prove conclusively that there was no such allegation: counsel just needed the CPS report. But she didn’t have it, because the state–in what it concedes was a violation of its Brady obligations–didn’t turn it over. SCOW now says “eh, who cares?” and reverses the court of appeals’ grant of a new trial. [continue reading…]
Kenosha County v. L.A.T., 2022AP603, 1/11/22, District 2; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This appeal involves an important, recurring issue. Must the circuit court conduct a colloquy to determine whether the subject of a ch. 51 commitment proceeding knowingly and voluntarily stipulates to a commitment and medication? The court of appeals holds that there is no colloquy requirement, and there shouldn’t be one. The subject of ch. 51 commitment is presumed competent. If she says she’s stipulating to a commitment and medication, then the circuit court can (1) presume she’s making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, and (2) find her dangerous without specifying a standard of dangerousness. [continue reading…]
Calumet County DH&HS v. T.M.S., 2022AP1563-FT, 1/11/23; District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court recommitted T.M.S. based on the 3rd and 4th standards of dangerousness. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the county’s evidence and underscored Dr. Bales’ admission that he couldn’t point to any specific information in T.M.S.’s treatment records showing that T.M.S. was currently dangerous. The court of appeals, applying only the 4th standard, affirmed. [continue reading…]
State v. Jeffrey W. Butler, 2021AP2212-CR, 1/11/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At Butler’s restitution hearing, the circuit court expressed frustration and disappointment that neither party presented any documentation regarding a disputed restitution claim. The court stated, “I have nothing other than testimony saying [the victim’s] done all this stuff and Googled it and she doesn’t bring in any receipts.” The court continued: “Nothing, I have nothing…[s]o the court is left with, based on testimony, what’s a reasonable amount of restitution…” The court then concluded, “I’ll put $500 toward clothing.” Butler appealed and the court of appeals affirms, holding that the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support the restitution award. [continue reading…]
State v. Clinton D. Clucas, 2022AP965, 12/30/22, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is a pretrial state’s appeal under Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2.. The trial court excluded three of the four prior incidents the state proposed to offer as evidence in Clucas’s trial for disorderly conduct with the domestic abuse enhancer. The court of appeals affirms, concluding the state’s proffered “permissible purpose” for the evidence is really just propensity by another name. [continue reading…]
State v. Tisha Lee Love, 2022AP1422, 12/30/22, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Love appeals a jury verdict rendered against her for driving 87 miles per hour in a 55 zone. [continue reading…]
