State v. K.R.C., 2023AP2102, 10/30/24, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
In a “close” suppression appeal, COA confronts a fact pattern arising from the intersection between policing and school discipline, finds that a reasonable 12-year old would have felt free to walk away from interviews with law enforcement and school authorities on school grounds, and finds the repeated injection of inadmissible evidence at the court trial harmless.
At the time this case originated, Kevin was a twelve-year-old student. (¶22). Another male student reported to a teacher that Kevin touched his crotch while in the school hallway. (¶3). As a result, a school official “sent” Kevin to the office of the school resource officer. (¶5). The officer was wearing an “outer carrier vest” over dress clothes. (Id.). The meeting occurred in the officer’s “closet” size office, with another, uniformed, officer standing in front of the door, which was closed. (Id.). Although Kevin was never told that he was free to leave, the officer had helpfully taped up a sign in the office reading “You Are in Here Voluntarily Unless Told Otherwise. You are Being Filmed and Can Leave at Any Time!” (Although that sign was never referenced by either Kevin or the officer.) (¶6). Kevin was not read his Miranda rights. (¶7). The officer then told Kevin there were witnesses to his conduct, a statement the officer later admitted was untrue. (Id.). After Kevin admitted to touching the other boy, albeit by accident, there was a follow-up interview in a “cubicle” where, in addition to the two police officers, the assistant principal questioned Kevin. (¶8). The SRO conceded that she “maybe” raised her voice in this second interaction. (¶9).
After a delinquency petition was issued charging Kevin with sexual assault, he filed a motion to suppress, which was denied. (¶10). At the ensuing court trial, the State called another boy, Jonathan, that said that he and Kevin would often hit each other and the SRO testified that Jonathan had described conduct similar to what Kevin was on trial for. (¶¶12-13). The circuit court denied an other-acts objection, finding the evidence harmless. (¶14). It adjudicated him delinquent. (¶15).
Miranda Motion
Kevin first argues that his statements from the two interviews should have been suppressed, as he was in custody and not provided with Miranda warnings. (¶18). The test for Miranda custody focuses on whether “a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” (¶19). Here, COA finds that Kevin’s young age “weighs in favor of a conclusion that he was in custody.” (¶22). The State also concedes that Kevin was being interviewed about a serious matter, an alleged sexual assault. (¶23). However, COA finds that the setting of the interview was not “custodial.” Kevin was not “crowded” by the SRO while in the closet-size room and, while his freedom of movement was necessarily restrained by virtue of the school setting, this interview did not take place in a “police station or vehicle.” (¶23). Moreover, the the short length of the interview(s) counsel against a finding of custody. (Id.). COA also finds its significant that the officers did not draw their weapons, place Kevin in handcuffs, and that he was never formally arrested. (¶24).
COA acknowledges this is “a somewhat close case” given the dynamics of the encounter and notes that it is “troubled” by the presence of the second uniformed officer. (¶25). However, it finds that Kevin went to the office willingly, was never told he could not leave, and was in the presence of the aforementioned and apparently authoritative sign telling the reader they were present voluntarily (unless told otherwise). (¶26). Accordingly, Kevin was not in custody and Miranda warnings were not required.
Hm.
Kevin, a twelve-year old boy under the supervision of adults delegated the authority to control his bodily movements while on campus, was “sent” to an office exclusively used by a police officer; he was then shut inside that closet-size room with two armed officers, one of whom stood in front of the door for the duration of the interview, and then subjected to an interrogation using deceptive practices designed to elicit incriminating responses. Would a “reasonable” child under these circumstances really have felt free to stand up, ask the second officer to step aside, open the closed door and return to class against the directive he had previously received from another authority figure?
We have our doubts. Thus, as Judge Geenen of District I recently pointed out in an interesting dissent, it is fact patterns like these that expose the legal fiction at the heart of our “reasonable person” standards. (“Studies demonstrate that the mythical “reasonable person” who exists only in judicial decisions does not generally reflect what real, everyday people think and how they act when approached by law enforcement officers.”)
More broadly, the case is also interesting as it is a timely reminder of the ongoing debate over the presence of law enforcement officers inside schools, with some critics arguing that their participation in school disciplinary decisions can be problematic. Notably, this opinion succeeds largely by deemphasizing “School Resource Officers” as what they actually are, police officers. For example, the opinion finds it significant that Kevin was not taken to a police station for questioning. But when the police have set up an ad hoc “station” within the walls of a school, isn’t being shut inside that room equally as compelling? Does anyone think that an 8×11 sign in any other context would have so much constitutional significance?
At the very least, Kevin has the seeds of an interesting PFR which will invite the justices to weigh in on this important topic at a time when other legal developments–such as the legislature’s yet-to-be implemented dictate to our State’s largest district to put police back into schools–continue to foment discussion and debate along these lines.
Voluntariness
Given COA’s framing of the facts, Kevin’s voluntariness claim doesn’t fare much better, especially considering case law which requires evidence of “coercive or improper” police practices. (¶29). Even though the bar is slightly lower for Kevin as he is a child, COA ultimately concludes that while the dynamics of the police-citizen encounters at issue may have created “stress” and caused him to “feel pressured to answer the officer’s questions” there was no “excessive” physical or psychological pressure. (¶32). Neither the SRO’s use of deception in the first interview nor her raised voice in the second are sufficient. (¶33). “The officers were not physically violent towards Kevin, nor did they deprive him of sleep, food, or anything else he requested.” (¶33).
Admission of Other Acts Evidence
COA concludes that even if the circuit court erred–and it acknowledges that the court’s comments are ambiguous–any error was harmless. (¶39). The court stated it was not relying on the disputed testimony and instead relied primarily on the statement of the victim. (¶40). These disavowals of reliance are sufficient to prove harmlessness and COA affirms.
Turns out it’s really as simple as: “A student such as plaintiff summoned to the administrative offices of school for questioning would not feel free to leave regardless whether police officers or school personnel were conducting the questioning. ”. Husband v. Turner, 2008 WL 2002737, at 7 (W.D. Wis. 2008) Judge Crabb got it.
This makes a mockery of reasonable person standard.
Well I guess the reasonable thirteen year old in that situation would have felt comfortable telling the principal and SRO that he was invoking his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination before walking right past the officer guarding the door and back to class. Maybe throw in a “you can’t talk to me because of the constitution!” on the way out the door. Because, you know, that’s what all of us would have done at that age. The “reasonable person” is no more real than any of the characters kids the same age dressed up as for trick or treating last week, but we persist with this fiction in criminal law for the sole purpose of prosecuting children and others who are similarly unable to practically exercise their rights.